



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

*Platos Jugenddialoge und die Entstehungszeit des "Phaidros."* By HANS VON ARNIM. Leipzig: Teubner, 1914. Pp. vii-224.

Professor von Arnim does not believe that we can distinguish in Plato's writings a Socratic stratum antedating the doctrine of ideas, and a period of old age in which the theory was tacitly abandoned. He accepts *The Unity of Plato's Thought* as against all recent endeavors to determine the order of composition of the dialogues by supposed contradictions, inconsistencies, and developments in Plato's own thinking. But his philological conscience revolts against the ἀργὸς λόγος that would therefore abandon the problem of Platonic chronology as both insignificant and insoluble. He believes that the method of style statistics rightly used is capable of solving the problem. But inasmuch as his own painstaking investigations in this field (cf. *Classical Philology*, VII, 490) have not yet been fully appreciated by his colleagues, he suspends his labors in this direction for a time, in order to test and confirm his results by another method. Though the order of composition of the dialogues need not coincide with that of the development of their ideas in Plato's mind, it may very well be the order in which he intended and felt it necessary to present them to his readers. And conversely, if we can show that the full understanding of one dialogue presupposes acquaintance with another, we may fairly presume that they were published in the sequence that would make them intelligible.

In the first half of the first volume, Professor von Arnim applies this plausible method to the so-called minor or earlier dialogues with great acumen and, in the main, resisting the temptation to strain the evidence in favor of his thesis. The *Protagoras* (presumably the earliest dialogue) precedes the *Laches* because Nicias in the *Laches* proposes as well-known Socratic doctrine a definition of courage elaborated as something new and unfamiliar in the *Protagoras*. The assumption in the *Charmides* that οἰκεία is an accepted synonym of ἀγαθά would commend itself only to a reader who knew the *Lysis*. The earlier and independent publication of the first book of the *Republic* is confirmed by the fuller and more convincing development of some of its ideas in the *Gorgias*. It follows the *Laches* and the *Protagoras*, since it takes as a matter of course the parallelism of τέχνη and ἀρετή which they work out. And it precedes the *Lysis*, which in 217E refines upon and corrects the argument of *Republic* 341DE on the relation of the good, the evil, and the neutral. The protreptic discussions of the Euthydemus presuppose all of these dialogues as well as the *Meno*.

Of a similar character is the argument in the second part (pp. 156 f.) that the psychological *Phaedrus* myth would not be intelligible except to readers already acquainted with the fourth book of the *Republic* and its application of the doctrine of the tripartite soul to ethics—an argument which my own experience with students confirms:

"Also nicht, weil die Lehre von der Dreiteiligkeit der Seele bis zur *Republik* dem Philosophen fremd gewesen müsste (was ihre Ignorierung im

*Phaidon* durchaus nicht beweist)—nicht deswegen muss der *Phaidros* nach der *Republik* geschrieben sein, sondern weil die Allegorie des *Phaidros* nur von Lesern verstanden und gewürdigt und genossen werden konnte, welche die '*Republik*' bereits gelesen hatten" (p. 161).

This brief summary of course does not do justice to Professor von Arnim's many interesting applications of his method, but may serve to indicate its general scope. I suppose that he would not himself regard the assumption on which it rests as more than a strong presumption in any given instance. It would always remain possible that Plato in exceptional cases alluded to favorite ideas for which he had not thus prepared his readers. For example, the late Professor Adam, like Stallbaum not understanding the *φαντάσματα θεῶν* of *Republic* 532C, proceeded to emend it, but candidly withdrew the emendation when I pointed out that the enigmatic expression is fully explained in a passage of the later *Sophist* 266BD.

The interest of the book is by no means limited to these inferences about Platonic chronology. Professor von Arnim, as readers of his *History of Greek Philosophy*, his *Dio Chrysostomus*, and his *Fragments of the Stoics* know, is a very competent critic, not only of the text, but of the ideas, of his authors. And there are many suggestions in the present volume on which I should like to dwell did space permit. His contribution to the problem of the apparent contradictions between the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias* especially deserves mention. The matter is too complicated to discuss in a review. I have elsewhere indicated my opinion (*Classical Philology*, IX, 364) that the hedonistic calculus of the *Protagoras* cannot be separated from that of the *Laws*, and that Plato, like some modern opponents of utilitarianism, is compelled to make large concessions to the psychological truth of a doctrine whose language and emotional associations are distasteful to him. To this conflict of analytic thought with instinctive ethical feeling and aesthetic taste in himself, I would refer his apparent self-contradictions about pleasure, which after all are no greater than those of Jowett, Matthew Arnold, Ruskin, and many other modern writers.

Professor von Arnim is a careful workman and leaves few openings for the captious critic. I should like however to submit to him my doubts on one passage. In *Protagoras* 358C, ἄλλο τι οὖν . . . ἐπί γε τὰ κακὰ οὐδείς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται, he assumes that the οὖν necessarily represents the proposition as an inference from the preceding hedonistic argument. Is it not possible to regard the οὖν as merely continuative (cf. Aristoph. *Nubes* 423) and to base the self-evident proposition, so far as it requires confirmation, on the very meaning of κακά as emphasized by γε? This use of what I sometimes nickname in the classroom the *ex vi termini γε* is not uncommon. We find it, for example, in conjunction with ἄλλο τι οὖν in *Republic* 576C: ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννομένην πόλιν ἂν εἴη ὁμοιότῃτι;